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Labor Law's Alter Ego Doctrine: The Role of Employer Motive
in Corporate Transformations
For over fifty years, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or ·
Act) 1 has provided employees2 with the statutory right to choose an
exclusive bargaining representative3 (i.e., a labor union) with whom
their employer must bargain collectively. 4 The goal of the bargaining
process is a collective bargaining contract agreed to by both the union
and the employer. 5 Unfortunately, some employers attempt to disavow their bargaining obligations and valid labor contracts following,
or through, a change in corporate form.
The most blatant disavowal of NLRA responsibilities involves an
employer motivated by anti-union animus. 6 One example of evasion
has been described as follows:
The United Auto Workers ... caustically refers to it as "management's neutron bomb - you eliminate the union workforce, but keep the
business intact."
"It" involves a union shop's owners locking the doors, only to move
1. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)).
See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 79-94
(10th ed. 1986) (describing the origins and development of the NLRA).
2. Large segments of the work force are not covered by the NLRA. For example, public
employees are exempt from the Act, as are those employed in the agricultural sector. See NLRA
§§ 2(2), (3), 29 u.s.c. §§ 152(2), (3) (1982). See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN,
supra note 1, at 95-104 (discussing scope of National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction).
3. This right is stated in NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), which provides in pertinent
part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
.•.. " (emphasis added).
4. This obligation is imposed by NLRA §§ 8(a)(5) & 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & 159(a)
(1982). Section 8(a)(5) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of section 9(a)." Section 9(a) in turn provides that
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
5. The obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970):
One of the[] fundamental policies [of the NLRA] is freedom of contract•.•• [A]llowing the
Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate
the fundamental premise on which the Act is based - private bargaining under govemmen·
tal supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms
of the contract.
See also NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 282 (1972) (quoting NLRA § 8(d)).
6. "Anti-union animus" is a broader term than mere "personal dislike" and encompasses all
negative labor-related motives (e.g., an employer's desire to escape high labor costs). See note 83

infra.

1024

April 1988]

Note -

Alter Ego Doctrine

1025

across the street or across the state and reopen a short time later under a
non-union umbrella. In what's commonly referred to as an alter-ego
transaction, only the names of the company and the workforce change. 7

An employer cannot, however, evade its responsibilities in such a blatant manner. 8 In the "neutron bomb" case described above, a union
will generally file unfair labor practice charges under sections 8(a)(l),
(3), and (5) of the Act. 9
In considering such charges, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") applies a test known as the "alter ego doctrine" - an inquiry into whether the "new" (successor) employer is in
fact the same as the "old" (predecessor) employer. An alter ego employer's refusal to bargain with the predecessor's union will at a minimum constitute an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(5) 10 and
8(a)(l). 11 Additionally, an alter ego employer that discriminatorily
fires its workforce commits an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(3). 12
The United States Supreme Court established the alter ego doctrine over forty years ago in Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB. 13 The
test seeks to determine "[w]hether there was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership ... or merely a disguised contin7. Engel, Name Game: Union-Busting or Good Business?, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr. 18, 1983,
at 19.
8. See Parts I.B and II infra.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l), (3), & (5) (1982).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). See note 4 supra.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1982). The§ 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice gives rise to a derivative
violation of§ 8(a)(l). Section 8(a)(l) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section ,7."
Because actions described in subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) constitute interference with an
employee's § 7 rights, a violation of any of these subsections has been held to be a derivative
violation of§ 8(a)(l). See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note l, at 114. Thus, a complaint alleging alter ego status will always contain a derivative § 8(a)(l) charge, even though the
focus is on a § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain.
12. In a "neutron bomb" case, see text at note 7 supra, the firing of the work force usually
involves employer discrimination. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), prohibits any
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." While many employers changing their corporate form do, in fact, attempt to fire some or all of their work force, in
many instances the employer attempts to keep the work force, and merely shed itself of the
union; thus, while § 8(a)(3) may be implicated in an alter ego case, not all such cases violate the
section. Compare NLRB v. McAllister Bros., 819 F.2d 439, 443 (4th Cir. 1987) ("new" employer "did not offer jobs to fifteen of [its predecessor's] Union employees"), and NLRB v. Bell
Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1267 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting a Board finding that discharge of employees
was discriminatorily motivated), with NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 578 (6th
Cir. 1986) (involving only a § 8(a)(5) violation for "repudiating the collective bargaining agreement"), and Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen Local 576 v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 223
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (same). In contrast, almost all alter ego cases involve at a minimum a§ 8(a)(5)
charge because the employer is, by definition, repudiating the collective bargaining contract
based on its claim of being a "new" employer, regardless of whether it retains the predecessor's
work force. But see Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983) (involving only§§ 8(a)(l) &
(3) charges).
13. 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
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uance of the old employer." 14 An employer cannot escape liability
"[i]f there was merely a change in name." 15 A subsequent employer
found to be the alter ego of its predecessor is not only bound to bargain with its predecessor's union, but is held to the terms of the prior
collective bargaining agreement itself. 16
Although the alter ego doctrine is well-settled in cases where an
employer's change in corporate form is motivated by anti-union animus or an intent to evade its collective bargaining obligations, corporate transformations also occur for reasons unrelated to animus. The
Supreme Court's Southport decision did not address the appropriate
role of employer motive in such cases. The courts of appeals are divided on the proper role of motive, and no clear majority favors any
particular standard. 17 There are, however, three primary approaches
to reviewing NLRB alter ego findings.
Some courts argue that animus is "critical"; the court will not enforce an NLRB alter ego order if the Board has not first found an
"intent to evade." 18 A second approach contends that animus is
merely "relevant": "[A] finding of employer intent is not essential or
prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, it is merely one
of the relevant factors which the Board can consider, along with the
well-established factors of substantial identity of management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision and ownership . . . ." 19 A third approach, espoused by the Fourth Circuit,
finds an alter ego relationship only if (1) the same entity controls the
old and new employer; and (2) the employer anticipated a "reasonably
foreseeable benefit . . . related to the elimination of its labor obligations."20 The Fourth Circuit based its standard on an analysis of Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 21 The NLRB
itself has not taken a clear position on the appropriate standard, with
some members arguing that animus is "relevant, but not prerequisite"
to imposing alter ego status, while other members imply that it is
"critical."22 The division among the courts of appeals and the Board is
not without practical significance. The increasing number of alter ego
cases during the past fifteen years underscores the need for a uniform
14. 315 U.S. at 106.
15. 315 U.S. at 106.
16. See text at note 70 infra.
17. See Part II infra.
18. See Part II.A infra.
19. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); see
Part 11.B infra. The "well-established" factors referred to by the Sixth Circuit were formulated
by the NLRB in Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976). The Board continues to
apply these factors, which are accepted by all of the federal courts of appeals. See Part I.B.2
infra.
20. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983); see Part 11.C infra.
21. 380 U.S. 263 (1965); see Part 11.C infra.
22. See notes 82, 90 & text at 133 infra.
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standard. 23
This Note examines the differing judicial approaches for reviewing
NLRB alter ego findings, and concludes that a fundamental problem
with all of the current approaches is the unwarranted consideration of
motive in varying degrees. This Note proposes a modified "reasonably
foreseeable benefit" standard which does not depend in any degree on
the employer's motive for changing its corporate form. Part I discusses the origin and evolution of the alter ego doctrine, including its
genesis in Southport Petroleum, the well-settled Crawford Door factors,
and the related "successorship" doctrine. Part II analyzes the conflict
among the federal courts of appeals over the role of employer motive
and Supreme Court cases in related areas of labor law. This part
maintains that the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit"
standard provides an excellent foundation for the appropriate standard, and proposes a modified approach in which (1) the Board applies the flexible, seven-factor Crawford Door test; and (2) if it finds
that the "new" employer is in reality the same as its predecessor, the
Board must then inquire whether the old employer anticipated a "reasonably foreseeable benefit" for any reason. Alter ego status is found
only if both prongs of the test are met. 24
Part III examines the policy considerations attendant to accommodating the tension between legitimate employee expectations and an
employer's freedom to rearrange its business - and to go out of business - as it sees fit. The modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit"
standard proposed in Part II properly defines the bounds of both legit23. Over the course of a 25-year career with the NLRB (1962-1987), Elliott Moore had an
opportunity to observe the progression of alter ego cases. His general impression about trends in
the number of such cases is of their infrequent occurrence during the 1960s and early 1970s, and
of increasing activity (and importance) during the past fifteen years. Telephone interview with
Elliott Moore, former Deputy Associate General Counsel of the NLRB (Mar. 29, 1988). Statistics kept by the NLRB beginning in 1970 bear out Mr. Moore's impressions. From 1970 through
1974, only four alter ego cases were adjudicated at any level (AU, NLRB, and federal courts).
CLASSIFIED INDEX OF NLRB DECISIONS & RELATED COURT DECISIONS 375-76 (Employer
Obligation to Bargain,§ 520(4850 3300)) (June 1974) [hereinafter CLASSIFIED INDEX] (covering
decisions issued from July 1970 through June 1974). There were 23 cases during the remainder
of the decade. CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 347 (Dec. 1976)) (covering July 1974 through Dec.
1976) and CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 632-33 (Dec. 1979) (covering Jan. 1977 through Dec.
1979). During the 1980s, there have been 35 cases to date. CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 686
(Dec. 1982) (covering Jan. 1980 through Dec. 1982), CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 352-53 (Dec.
1984) (covering Jan. 1982 through Dec. 1984), CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 373-74 (Dec. 1986)
(covering Jan. 1985 through Dec. 1986), and CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 121 (June 1987) (covering Jan. 1987 through June 1987). In addition, these statistics do not include the large number
of settled cases that never reach trial. For example, from October 1985 through September 1987,
approximately 92% of all cases in which the General Counsel issued a complaint were settled.
NLRB Internal Memorandum GC-88-3, Summary of Operations for Fiscal Year 1987, at 3
(Mar. 9, 1988) (Copy on file with Michigan Law Review). A slightly lower settlement rate of
85% is used as a rule of thumb for any given year. Telephone interview with James Y. Callear,
FOIA Officer, NLRB Legal Research & Policy Planning Branch, Division of Advice, Office of
the General Counsel (Mar. 30, 1988). These percentages do not include cases that were settled
prior to the issuance of a complaint. Id.
24. See Part 11.C infra.
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imate employee expectations and employer freedom. Predictability
and uniformity are achieved in NLRB decisions without an undue sacrifice in the Board's ability to apply flexibly the Crawford Door factors.
I.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE

A.

Congress's Broad Brush: The NLRA

The legislative history, and the language of the NLRA itself, state
Congress's two broad labor-law objectives - "to promote industrial
peace and equality of bargaining power."25 The way in which Congress sought to accomplish this goal was through "removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest." 26 Two of the
NLRA provisions designed for this purpose are applicable to this
Note. 27 First, section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain collectively with the representative of its employees. 28 Second, section
8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination in hiring, tenure, or terms and conditions of employment which encourage or discourage union membership. 29 However, neither the legislative history nor the language of the
Act addresses the problem of an employer changing its corporate form
and potentially escaping from the predecessor employer's NLRA
obligations.
Recognizing the impossibility of fashioning a comprehensive set of
rules and regulations, Congress gave the NLRB a mandate to carry
out its national labor policies and objectives. 30 The Board thus has
primary responsibility for deciding whether an unfair labor practice
25. S. REP. No. 573, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935); NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)
(statement of findings and policies); see, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 454 (1957); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33, 45 (1937).
26. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
27. A violation of either of these sections also triggers a violation of § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(l) (1982). See note 11 supra.
28. See note 4 supra. In addition, NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), defines the
phrase "to bargain collectively," providing in pertinent part:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .•.• [W]here there
is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees ... the duty to bargain col·
lectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such
contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification [meets specified terms,
such as a 60-day written-notice period]. The duties imposed ... shall become inapplicable
. . . [if] the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been
superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees ...•
In an alter ego case, the "new" employer not only terminates the contract, but refuses to bargain
with the union altogether, arguing that the union has "ceased to be the representative of the
employees." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). If the "new" employer is found to be an
alter ego, however, it has failed to bargain collectively as defined in § 8(d), and hence violates
§ 8(a)(5). See also text at note 115 infra.
29. See note 12 supra.
30. NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982), provides in pertinent part: "The Board shall have
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."
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violation has occurred under section 8. 31 A reviewing court must accept "the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole." 32 Because alter ego determinations have been held to be questions of fact, 33 the NLRB's findings are entitled to judicial deference,
although such deference does not leave the courts without a significant
role in this area. 34 This role, and the interplay of the NLRB and the
courts, is the subject of the next section.

B. Filling in the Details: The NLRB and the Courts
1.

Genesis: Southport Petroleum

The alter ego doctrine originated in the early 1940s with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Southport Petroleum Co. v.
NLRB. 35 Given that the lower courts and the NLRB put great weight
on the language of the Court's holding, 36 and that Southport was the
first and last pronouncement of the Court on this subject, 37 an indepth review of both the facts and the holding of the case is important.
This subpart will show that the language of Southport does not support an intent requirement beyond those cases in which an employer
clearly intends to evade its bargaining obligations.
Southport Petroleum was a Texas corporation that had engaged in
various unfair labor practices. 38 The Board found violations of sec31. As noted earlier, the key provision with respect to the alter ego doctrine is NLRA
§ 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). See note 12 supra.
32. NLRA § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). The courts must defer to the Board's expertise where its findings are supported by substantial evidence, even though the reviewing court
could "justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). The primary justification for this deference is
that the Board is "one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal
with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an
expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect." 340 U.S. at 488; see also
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495 (1979).
33. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942) ("Whether there was a
bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership· ... is a question of fact."); see also
Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711
F.2d 543, 553 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984).
34. The characterization of an alter ego finding as a "question of fact" does not mean that the
courts of appeals have no role to play in the doctrine. The current division among the courts as
to the appropriate legal standard the Board must apply in making its/actual determination, see
Part II infra, before enforcement will be granted makes clear that this is actually a mixed question of law and fact.
35. 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
36. See Part II infra.
37. The Supreme Court does, however, discuss the alter ego doctrine as dicta in a related
successorship doctrine case. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974). The Court's alter ego footnote is
discussed in Part l.C infra.
38. Southport, 315 U.S. at 101, 102. The primary violation was the discriminatory discharge
of "three employees at [Southport's] Texas City, Texas, oil refinery because of their membership
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tions 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(l), 39 and ordered Southport to cease and desist
from these practices.40 Approximately ten months after the Board's
order, Southport "entered into a written stipulation ... that it would
obey the order."41 Only three days later, Southport "distributed all of
its assets to its four stockholders as a liquidating dividend; and [the
stockholders] conveyed it to a newly organized Delaware corporation."42 The shareholders then claimed that, because the predecessor
company had been dissolved, the Board's remedial order was invalid. 43
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's order on a narrow holding
based upon Texas law. 44 The Supreme Court's affirmance was based
on a similarly narrow holding. The sole issue before the Court was
whether the court of appeals erred in denying Southport's application
for leave to adduce additional evidence that the Texas company had
dissolved, and was therefore beyond the reach of the Board's remedial
order.45
The Court rejected the shareholders' contention. Speaking for the
Court, Justice Jackson stated that the appropriate test was "Whether
there was a bqna fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership
- which would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the
Board's order - or merely a disguised continuance of the old employer .... " 46 Justice Jackson further noted that Southport's business
operation "might have continued under the old business form or under
a disguise intended to evade [the Board's reinstatement] provision. If
there was merely a change in name or in apparent control there is no
reason to grant [Southport] relief from the Board's order ...." 47
and activity in (the union] ..•." Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 3, Southport
Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942) (No. 67); see also 315 U.S. at 102·03.
39. The Board did not find a violation of § 8(a)(5) for refusing to bargain with the union;
rather, it found a violation only for the discriminatory discharge claim. See Southport Petroleum
Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 792, 806 (1938), enforced, NLRB v. Southport Petroleum Co., 117 F.2d 90 (5th
Cir. 1941), affd., 315 U.S. 100 (1942). There is no indication from the facts that the "old" or
"new" company ever repudiated its collective bargaining contract or duty to bargain with the
union. Such facts are present in most current alter ego litigation. See note 12 supra.
40. 8 N.L.R.B. at 807.
41. 315 U.S. at 102.
42. 315 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
43. 315 U.S. at 103.
44. The court stated:
[Southport] has filed ... for leave to adduce additional evidence to the effect that, subsequent to the entry of the order by the Board, it disposed of all of its assets, and was dissolved. [Southport] is a Texas corporation. Under the laws of that state the corporation,
upon dissolution, is continued in existence for a period of three years for the purpose of
suing and being sued. Conceding that the dissolution has taken place, it can have no effect
upon this proceeding.
NLRB v. Southport Petroleum Co., 117 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1941), ajfd., 315 U.S. 100 (1942)
(footnote omitted).
45. See 315 U.S. 100, 108 (Reed, J., dissenting) (grant of certiorari was limited to the issue of
leave to adduce additional evidence). See also Brief for NLRB at 2, Southport (No. 67) (same).
46. 315 U.S. at 106.
47. 315 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added). Justice Jackson added that, "The additional evidence
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The Court's affi.rmance of the Board's order was directed at a
clearly recalcitrant employer. Southport had ignored the Board's order to remedy its unfair labor practices for ten months before entering
into a stipulation to carry out the order.48 It then liquidated and transferred ownership only three days after stipulating its compliance - an
act the Board considered to be an indication of "bad faith." 49 Given
the narrow issue presented to the Court, 50 and the evasive actions of
an employer that clearly continued its business operations, there was
no need to rule on whether an absence of intent to evade NLRA duties
might be a defense to alter ego status. Likewise, there was no need to
decide whether the presence of animus might nonetheless be irrelevant
to determining such status.
2.

The Generally Accepted Factors: Crawford Door

Following Southport, the courts of appeals have differed regarding
the intent criterion, 51 but have agreed on the seven objective factors
enunciated by the NLRB in Crawford Door Sales Co. 52 In considering
whether to apply the alter ego doctrine, the Board determines whether
"the two enterprises have 'substantially identical' management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, and supervision, as
well as ownership." 53 The test is flexible - the NLRB does not need
to find the presence of all seven factors. In addition, the "substantially
identical'' language provides additional flexibility with respect to each
individual factor.54
was immaterial for the further reason that the Board's order ran not only to the petitioner, but
also its 'officers, agents, successors, and assigns.'" 315 U.S. at 106 (footnote omitted).
48. 315 U.S. at 102.
49. See Brief for NLRB at 6, Southport (No. 67).
50. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text (leave to adduce additional evidence).
51. See Part II infra.
52. 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976).
53. 226 N.L.R.B. at 1144. The Crawford factors are cited with approval in, e.g., Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Dane County
Dairy, 795 F.2d 1313, 1321 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 579
(6th Cir. 1986); Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984); Alkire v.
NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983); Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d
1416, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553-54 (3d Cir. 1983), cerL
denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984); Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d
489, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
Although this Note refers to "the Board" as though it were a monolithic entity, the NLRB
decisionmaking process begins with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who makes findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and rulings based on a hearing. Appeals of the ALJ's decisions are
made to the NLRB. The Board's and ALJ's opinions will not be discussed separately unless
otherwise noted.
54. For example, in Dane County Dairy, the court held that "[f]amilial control constitutes
common ownership and control.'' 795 F.2d at 1322; see also Advance Elec., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B.
1001, 1004 (1984) ("all stock in both corporations was owned by members of the [same] family
and all corporate officers and directors also were members of that family"); E.G. Sprinkler Corp.,
268 N.L.R.B. 1241, 1244 (citing Crawford Door, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1144) ("The Board has held
that stock ownership in different corporations by members of the same family constitutes owner-
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For example, in NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., ss the Third Circuit
enforced the Board's alter ego finding in spite of a legal change in ownership. The court provided the following summary of the relevant
facts:
[A] decline in the demand for composition work made the composing
room unprofitable for Scott. Because he was having difficulty meeting
non-union competition, Scott tried unsuccessfully to sell the composing
room. After the Union informed ... employees that Scott intended to
sell or to close down the composing room, [the employees], facing unemployment, offered to buy it.... [The employees] signed the [sales] contract without making any changes. s6

The court held that "[a] nominal change in ownership is not dispositive."s7 It looked at Crawford Door factors such as identical customers, operations, equipment, and supplies, but noted that "[t]he crucial
element in a decision to apply the alter ego doctrine . . . is a finding
that the older company continued to maintain a substantial degree of
control over the business claimed to have been sold to the new
entity."ss
The Tenth Circuit appears to have added an eighth element to the
Crawford Door analysis:
Another factor to be considered is the continuity of the work force. If
the second employer continues with substantially the same employees,
the second employer is more likely to be deemed an alter ego of the first.
If, however, the second employer has a substantially different work force
than did the first employer, the second employer is more likely to be
deemed a mere successor. S9

Continuity of the work force is not, however, a helpful indicator of
alter ego status. Although a new work force in an arms-length transaction would not indicate alter ego status, the lack of continuity of the
work force in the absence of an arms-length change of ownership
could provide excellent evidence that the "new" employer is in reality
the alter ego of its predecessor. Taking the Tenth Circuit's analysis to
ship and control which is 'substantially identical.'"), enforced sub nom. Goodman Piping Prods.,
741 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984).
55. 612 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1979).
56. 612 F.2d at 788.
57. 612 F.2d at 786.
58. 612 F.2d at 786 (noting with approval NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1267-68 (7th
Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added). The "control" element, however, is a gloss on the "ownership"
factor, rather than a discrete eighth factor. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dane County Dairy, 795 F.2d
1313, 1322 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that the Board had established "substantially identical ownership and/or control"). Also, although the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test
in Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983), focuses on the control element of
Crawford Door, see text at note 158 infra, the court has not rejected the Board's right to weigh all
seven criteria. 716 F.2d at 1018 & n.4.
59. NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Howard Johnson Co.
v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974)) (italics
in original).
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an extreme, our "neutron bomb" employer 60 could fire its entire work
force out of sheer animus, and then make a bootstrap argument that
because there is no "continuity of the work force," it is at most required to bargain with the union as a successor employer. 6I Therefore, continuity of the work force is a better indicator of an unfair
labor practice once the employer is identified as an alter ego
employer. 62
Additionally, in enunciating its new factor, the Tenth Circuit also
skirted the fine line dividing successorship and alter ego doctrines. Indeed, the court's reliance on Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Executive Board Hotel & Restaurant Employees 63 demonstrates the
need for understanding the difference between the alter ego and successorship doctrines.
C.

The Successorship Doctrine

"Successorship," 64 "alter ego," and "single employer," are three
related, yet distinct, doctrines that address whether, and to what extent, "one business entity [will be held] to the labor obligations of another."65 An examination of the single employer doctrine, 66 and of
60. See text at note 7 supra.
61. See Part LC infra.
62. Assuming the Crawford Door factors are met, both the "critical" and "relevant" approaches would find alter ego status based on the discriminatory firing of the work force. Likewise, an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach would use the discriminatory firing
as evidence that there was a reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer which did not
actually go out of business. (The distinction between a motive-based and objective standard is
that a different result is reached under the motive-based standard when the motive is legitimate.)
See Part II infra.
63. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
64. The successorship doctrine is relatively well settled, having been addressed by the United
States Supreme Court three times in the past two decades. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local
Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Bums Intl.
Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
The literature concerning the successorship doctrine is extensive. For commentary in addition to the brief coverage in Part I.C, see, e.g., Severson & Willcoxon, Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short Order Justice For Employees, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1976); Morris & Gaus,
Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Bums, 59
VA. L. REV. 1359 (1973); Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine ofEmployer SuccessorshipA Step Toward a Rational Approach, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (1973); St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 269,
269-77 (discussing NLRB v. Bums Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972)); Goldberg, The Labor
Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (1969); Note, The Bargaining
Obligations ofSuccessor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1975); Note, Contract Rights and the
Successor Employer: The Impact of Bums Security, 71 MICH. L. REv. 571 (1973).
65. Note, Bargaining Obligations After Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624,
625 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Bargaining Obligations].
66. The NLRB uses four criteria to determine whether two coexisting employers actually
constitute a single employer: interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership. See Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians
Local Union No. 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam).
Although the alter ego doctrine may also be applied to coexisting employers, alter ego and sue-
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the "double-breasting" aspects 67 to which both single employer and
cessorship cases generally arise when a new legal entity has replaced a predecessor entity (the
entities are sequential in time).
Single employer and alter ego charges often arise in the same case. See, e.g., NLRB v. Al
Bryant, Inc. 711 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984); Penntech Papers,
Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984). Also,
Professor Stephen Befort has pointed out that "the Board and the courts have recently begun to
commingle the strands of the two doctrines. Three recent Board decisions describe the alter ego
doctrine as 'an extension of the concept of single employer.' " Befort, Labor Law and the DoubleBreasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and a Proposed
Reformulation. 1987 Wis. L. REv. 67, 92 (footnote omitted). One of the three cases he describes
states:
We discuss "single employer'' and "alter ego" ... as though they were two separate ideas.
In doing so, we adopt the approach of text-writers and digesters, to whose hearts such neat
categories are dear. In fact, what is really happening ..• is that a number of factors ••• are
being treated as relevant to the question whether an employer, formally separate, should be
viewed as legally the same as another.
Id. at 92-93 (quoting Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 236 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1986)). This Note adopts those "neat categories," which is appropriate given its focus on
corporate transformations, which are sequential in time, rather than on the "double-breasting"
context, involving coexisting entities. For additional discussion of the single employer doctrine,
see generally id. at 75-89 (discussing the development and application of the single employer
doctrine to "double-breasted" cases); Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690
F.2d 489, 504-07 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing application to double-breasted contractors), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
67. "Double-breasting" originated in the construction industry to allow contractors to bid
for both union and nonunion jobs. The employer establishes a "subsidiary compan[y] to work
non-union jobs and compete in this market." Penfield, The Double-Breasted Operation in the
Construction Industry, 27 LAB. L.J. 89, 89 (1976). See also Befort, supra note 66; Comment,
Double-Breasted Operations in the Construction Industry: A Search for Concrete Guidelines, 6 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 45 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Double-Breasted Operations]; Comment,
Dual Companies - When Does a Union Have the Right to Expanded Representation?, 12 U.S.F.
L. REV. 89 (1977). See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note I, at 852-53
(discussing "double-breasted" employers). Professor Befort has written an excellent and compre·
hensive article on the subject. He points out the "failure of the single employer and alter ego
doctrines as theoretical bases for evaluating double-breasted operations ... .'' Befort, supra note
66, at 101. Befort proposes a four-part "double-breasting" test addressing "common ownership
or continued financial benefit, diversion of unit work, appropriate bargaining unit, and motive.''
Id. He views the motive element as a relevant, but not prerequisite, factor. Id. at 104. Professor
Befort's proposed test would help bring coherence to the traditional "double-breasting" cases,
and might alleviate some of Congress's current concerns - in 1987 the House of Representatives
passed legislation that "would prevent unionized construction companies from setting up separate, nonunionized divisions," Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1987, § 2, at 15, col. l, although the legislation died in the Senate. Id.
Although this Note does not address the "double-breasting" aspects of the alter ego doctrine,
it does discuss and analyze "double-breasting" cases that fall outside of the traditional construction industry context. For example, in NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir.
1986), the predecessor employer, a moving company working both as an independent and as an
Atlas Van Lines agent split into two successor companies - one union and one nonunion allegedly in response to an Atlas policy change prohibiting its agents from simultaneously operat·
ing independently. See text at notes 136-39 infra. As the ALJ correctly pointed out, however:
While these circumstances may explain the decision to create [the nonunion company] as a
separate corporation, they do not explain a totally separate and subsequent decision on [the
employer's] part in refusing to apply to [the new company's] employees the terms and conditions of employment which governed their performance of Atlas work prior to the change in
corporate structure.
Allcoast Transfer, 271 N.L.R.B. 1374, 1379, enforced, 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986). Unlike the
motive-based justification (which is nonetheless suspect) of construction employers who must bid
on both union and nonunion jobs, there is no motive-based justification in the nontraditional
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alter ego concepts are often applied, are beyond the scope of this Note.
This subpart instead focuses on the "absolute distinction between alter
ego concepts ... and so-called successorship cases." 68 The Tenth Circuit's use of "continuity of the work force" 69 as an alter ego criterion
provides a reason for discussing the Supreme Court's own distinction
between successorship and alter ego concepts and for reviewing the
different policy concerns underlying the two doctrines.
The different factual settings and legal consequences of suqcessorship· and alter ego cases are summarized as follows:
[T]he issue of successorship arises only when there is a bona fide
purchase or sale, meaning an arm's length relinquishment of control between two independent entities. If the purchaser in a transaction is
found to be an alter ego of the selling party, the seller's contractual obligations will be applied to the purchaser/alter ego in their entirety.70

While an alter ego employer is bound to the terms of its predecessor's
collective bargaining contract, an arms-length successor employer71 is
normally subject at most to an obligation to recognize and bargain
with the predecessor's union. 72 The different legal consequences illuscase. As long as there is at least a partial cessation of business by the predecessor company, the
"foreseeable benefit" approach proposed by this Note, see Part II.C infra, adequately protects
employees without resort to Professor Befort's proposed test. The Sixth Circuit itself based its
decision entirely on traditional alter ego analysis without reference to the "double-breasting"
aspects of the case.
68. Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 424 (1977) (statement of AIJ).
69. See text at notes 59-63 supra.
70. P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: PLANT CLOSINGS,
RELOCATIONS, SUBCONTRACTING, AND AUTOMATION, 181 (Labor Rel. & Public Poly. Series,
No. 24, 1983). See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (distinguishing successor cases in which there is a
"substantial change in . . . ownership or management" from alter ego cases lacking such a
change); Dee Cee, 232 N.L.R.B. at 424 (successor employer is "always a stranger to the first ...
employer"); Befort, supra note 66, at 73 ("The absence of an arm's length relationship distinguishes the single employer and alter ego situations from that of the normal successorship
setting.").
71. There is a dispute over the proper definition of "successor employer." See, e.g., Howard
Johnson, 417 U.S. at 262 n.9 ("There is, and can be, no single definition of 'successor' which is
applicable in every legal context. A new employer ... may be a successor for some purposes and
not for others."); Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 643 n.129 ("'Successor' is a
term of art, although many cases use it as a generic term for all new enterprises."); Note, The
Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759, 759 n.l (1975) ("The
term 'successor' has often been used to express a legal conclusion that the new employer should
be held to certain of the obligations of its predecessor.... For clarity, the term as used [here] will
not imply that the new employer is held to any obligations, but will be used merely to refer to the
new employer."). This Note adopts the Harvard Law Review Note's use of the term as merely
referring to the new employer. Where it is not clear from the context of the discussion, the term
"arms-length successor" will be used to indicate a successor employer who is not bound to the
terms of the collective bargaining contract of its predecessor.
72. See NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 281-82 (holding that an employer is
not automatically held to the substantive terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining contract,
even if it hires a majority of the predecessor's employees). It can be argued, however, that Burns
did not involve a "true" successorship case. Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Brennan and Powell) argued in dissent that the successorship doctrine is based on
"the need to grant some protection to employees from a sudden transformation of their em-
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trate the danger of commingling the two doctrines.
The Tenth Circuit's adoption of "continuity in the work force" as
an alter ego criterion erroneously relies on the successorship cases.
The court cites Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive
Board Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 13 which held that an armslength successor is not required to arbitrate74 the predecessor employer's collective bargaining contract unless there is substantial continuity of the work force. 75 There are important distinctions, however,
between the arms-length successorship and alter ego cases. The
ployer's business that results in the substitution of a new legal entity, not bound by the collectivebargaining contract ... but leaves intact significant elements of the employer's business." 406
U.S. at 301. Such a need is not present when the successor employer acquires none of the predecessor's "tangible or intangible assets,'' 406 U.S. at 305, and the new employer's "only connection with the old employer [was] the hiring of some of the latter's employees." 406 U.S. at 306.
Shortly after Burns was decided, Professor Theodore St. Antoine wrote, "the door has been
left open for the Court to distinguish Burns in some of the more typical successorship situations
of sale or merger, and to find the predecessor's contract binding on a true successor." St. An·
toine, supra note 64, at 276. The Court's Howard Johnson decision in 1974 did not close the door
on Professor St. Antoine's contention. The Court held that an employer is not required to bar·
gain with its predecessor's union if there is not "continuity of identity in the business enterprise
[which] necessarily includes ... substantial continuity in the identity of the work force.'' Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249,
263 (1974). Because the successor employer in Howard Johnson did not hire a majority of its
predecessor's work force, the Court did not need to address the duty to bargain and contract
enforceability issues in the event of continuity. It specifically found it "unnecessary . , . to decide
... whether there is any irreconcilable conflict between Wiley and Burns." 417 U.S. at 256.
Finally, the Court notes: "Particularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the
myriad factual circumstances and legal contexts in which it can arise, and the absence of congressional guidance as to its resolution, emphasis on the facts of each case as it arises is especially
appropriate." 417 U.S. at 256.
It is thus possible that Professor St. Antoine's distinction of Burns is still valid, and that a
contract might be binding on a "true" successor. He maintains that this possibility continues to
exist. Interview with Theodore J. St. Antoine, James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law,
University of Michigan Law School (Jan. 20, 1988). If the distinction does exist, this Note's
argument for an objective standard is strengthened, because if an arms-length successor can be
bound to the terms of its predecessor's contract, a fortiori an alter ego employer with the same
ownership and control should be bound to its predecessor's contract regardless of its motive for
changing corporate form.
73. NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing 417 U.S. 249 (1974)).
See text at note 59 supra.
74. Howard Johnson, as well as the earlier successorship case of John Wiley & Sons v. Living·
ston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), arose under§ 30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Section 301 gives United States district courts jurisdiction
to hear suits to enforce collective bargaining contracts. The Howard Jolt11so11 Court stated,
however:
It would be plainly inconsistent ... to say that the basic policies found controlling in an
unfair labor practice context may be disregarded by the courts in a suit under § 301, and
thus to permit the rights enjoyed by the new employer in a successorship context to depend
upon the forum in which the union presses its claims.
417 U.S. at 256. See also Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d
489, 511 (5th Cir. 1982) (alter ego and single employer case recognizing same principle).
For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that suits arise in two different
forums - § 301 arbitration suits initiated in federal district court and unfair labor practice suits
initiated in NLRB agency proceedings - and that both are appealable to United States courts of
appeals. The forum is not, however, outcome-determinative.
75. 417 U.S. at 262-64.
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Court's own language distinguishes the concepts; in Howard Johnson,
Justice Marshall writes:
[T]his is not a case where the successor corporation is the "alter ego" of
the predecessor, where it is "merely the disguised continuance of the old
employer." Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106
(1942). Such cases involve a mere technical change in the structure or
identity of the employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the labor
laws, without any substantial change in its ownership or management.
In these circumstances, the courts have had little difficulty holding that
the successor is in reality the same employer and is subject to all the legal
and contractual obligations of the predecessor. 76

It is important to understand that the two doctrines are based on
different underlying policies.
The Court's policy concern in the
arms-length successorship cases is that "[a] potential employer may be
willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes
in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, ... and nature
of supervision." 77 In contrast, the alter ego doctrine focuses on
whether the successor "is in reality the same employer." 78 "The same
employer," in terms of the Crawford Door criteria, 79 cannot be allowed
to escape its contractual obligations by eliminating its union employees and then claiming "no substantial continuity of identity in the
work force." 80
Although the following point is unrelated to analyzing the validity
of "work force" as an alter ego criterion, one final observation should
be made about Justice Marshall's description of the alter ego doctrine
in Howard Johnson. He explains that in alter ego cases an employer
may "frequently" change its structure to avoid its NLRA duties. This
suggests that there may be circumstances involving a corporate transformation not motivated by a desire to avoid labor commitments that
should nonetheless result in alter ego status.
The terms "frequently" and "in reality the same employer" both
suggest that an objective inquiry into the alter ego status of a successor
employer is appropriate. A motive-based standard cannot, however,
be so easily dismissed. The uncertainty over the role of motive is illustrated both by the fact that the courts and the Board have not ac76. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5 (emphasis added).
77. 417 U.S. at 261 (quoting NLRB v. Bums Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972)).
The policy considerations attendant to successorship vis-a-vis alter ego are discussed at greater
length in Part III.B infra.
78. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5.
79. See Part I.B supra.
80. 417 U.S. at 264. For example, in NLRB v. McAllister Bros., the "new" employer used
its " 'imagination and talent to initiate an unusual but effective operational change' " which basically consisted of eliminating a large number of union employees. 819 F.2d 439, 443 (4th Cir.
1987). (Technically, the argument would be that the "new" employer did not hire the predecessor's union employees.) The court had no trouble finding an alter ego relationship between the
old and new employers; however, if work force were a factor, the task would be unjustifiably
more difficult.
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cepted (nor have they considered) the above interpretation of Justice
Marshall's dicta and by their divergent approaches to a motive-based
standard. Part II provides an examination of this role.
II.

DISAGREEMENT OVER THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER MOTIVE

Despite agreement among the courts of appeals and the NLRB on
the Crawford Door criteria, 81 disagreement persists over the role of
employer motive in determining alter ego status. 82 This Note places
the various positions taken on motive83 by the courts and the Board
into three broad categories - "critical," "relevant, but not prerequisite," and "reasonably foreseeable benefit." Within each category, the
underlying rationale and possible arguments for and against the approach are discussed. Ultimately, all of the current approaches are
rejected based on the conclusion that motive is an inappropriate consideration - whether a "successor employer is in reality the same employer"84 (i.e., an alter ego) should depend on the identity of the entity
itself, not on its reason for becoming that entity. An objective test
based on a modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard is proposed to accomplish this result.
81. See Part I.B supra.
82. "Disagreement" is an understatement - almost every court of appeals has considered
the role of motive in determining alter ego status, and even though this Note groups the courts
into three broad categories, there are several discrete positions within those categories. See
Befort, supra note 66, at 95-98 (grouping the courts into slightly different, but equally fractured,
categories).
The NLRB's position is also inconsistent:
The Board has repeatedly sidestepped the motive issue without adopting an identifiable position. Some cases suggest that the Board considers an improper motive to be a sufficient but
not required basis for an alter ego finding. More frequently, the Board describes motive as
an important additional factor that must be considered.
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted).
83. This Note uses the terms "motive," "intent to evade," and "anti-union animus" interchangeably. These terms encompass more than just a personal dislike of the union -;-- motive
refers to any labor-related reason. For example, in Advance Elec., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1001
(1984), the Board rejected the employer's defense that its change in corporate form was motivated by "economic reasons," equating "the purpose of eliminating the high costs associated with
operating Advance as a union contractor" with "evad(ing] Advance's responsibility under the
Act to honor its collective bargaining agreement." 268 N.L.R.B. at 1004. See also Watt Elec.
Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 655, 658 (1984) (ALJ stated, "Although Watt did not .•. harbor any personal
dislike, animus, or hate for the Union, the absence of such a motivation is not determinative");
Samuel Kosoff & Sons, 269 N.L.R.B. 424, 429 (1984) (The element of motivation was established
where Kosoff admitted to attempting to achieve a competitive position by operation a nonunion
firm.); Hageman Underground Constr., 253 N.L.R.B. 60, 68 (1980) ("The new company is considered an alter ego or disguised continuance of the old one when it is set up to enable a company
to continue operating while ridding itself of a union ... even though motivated by economic
considerations."); Befort, supra note 66, at 86 & n.125 (discussing Watt). Cf. note 110 infra and
accompanying text. The motive-based terms used herein should thus be read as labor-related
(motivated by, e.g., high union costs) and nonlabor-related (e.g., Atlas's policy change in Al/coast,
note 137 infra).
84. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974).
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The "Critical" Standard

Three federal courts of appeals have arguably adopted an examination of "[u]nlawful motive or intent [as the] critical inquir[y] in an
alter ego analysis." 85 The First and Eighth Circuits have explicitly
ruled to this effect, 86 while the Third Circuit probably falls into this
category. 87 The NLRB itself has not taken a clear position; 88 while
most of the Board's decisions apply a "relevant" standard, 89 two recent cases indicate that some NLRB members consider motive to be
critical. 90 However, examination of the merits of the "critical" standard demonstrates that it is the least justifiable of the positions currently taken.
As an initial observation, the cases are almost devoid of discussion
justifying the "critical" standard. The courts adhering to this standard generally refer to commentators and sister courts for support, 91
85. Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892
(1983).
86. Penntech, 106 F.2d at 24; Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234,
237 (8th Cir. 1986) ("A critical part of the inquiry into alter ego status ... is whether the
employers acted out of anti-union sentiment or to avoid a labor contract."). See also Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1088 (1984).
The First and Eighth Circuits have both cited the Tenth Circuit as also supporting intent as a
critical element. See Penntech, 106 F.2d at 24 (citing NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270
(10th Cir. 1980)); Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1311 (same). But see NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer,
Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Tricor as holding intent "relevant, but
... [not] essential"). The Sixth Circuit would seem to have the better argument, given the Tenth
Circuit's statement that "[t]here is no hard-and-fast rule." Tricor, 636 F.2d at 270.
87. The Third Circuit uses "fence-sitting" language such as "[a]ssuming without deciding
that in this case the General Counsel must prove ... inten[t] to evade," NLRB v. Scott Printing
Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1979), and "it is significant, if not crucial, that [the new
employer] was created after the filing of unfair labor practice charges. " NLRB v. Al Bryant,
Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 554 (3d Cir. 1983).
88. A precise understanding of each of the standards being applied by the Board and the
courts is actually less important than the fact that no consistent and justifiable standard is currently being applied. One commentary on double-breasting is equally appropriate in traditional
alter ego cases: "[l]n an area where concrete standards, applied with uniformity, are crucial to
unions and employers alike, the law remains largely unascertainable." Comment, DoubleBreasted Operations, supra note 67, at 48.
89. See note 133 infra.
90. In Apex Decorating Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1459 (1985), the Board's members could not
agree on what standard they were applying to the case. The Board's opinion states:
In adopting the [AU's] findings, we have relied on all the factors set forth in his decision,
including employer motivation .... [Member Dennis] declines to join us in this paragraph
because in her view antiunion motivation is not a sine qua non for a finding of alter ego
status. However, we have made no such assertion in stating our reasons for finding [alter ego
status].
275 N.L.R.B. at 1459 n.3 (emphasis added). Similar confusion over the appropriate standard is
apparent in Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1314 n.l (1985) (Board upheld AU's
alter ego finding despite lack of intent; one member agreed on the ground that employer had not
"rebutted the General Counsel's prima facie case of union animus"). See also Befort, supra note
66, at 98 (discussing Leslie Oldsmobile).
91. See, e.g., Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 238 (8th Cir.
1986) (citing Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir.) cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984), which in tum quotes Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18,
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but these sources themselves fail to provide a rationale for the position, 92 and predate the alter ego cases decided in the 1980s that address the role of motive. Three of the strongest arguments supporting
the standard, all of which ultimately fail, are the courts' reliance on
the language of Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 93 a statement by
the Eighth Circuit that appears to "temper" its position, and a possible
analogy to the "runaway shop" context in which some courts of appeals allow a "business necessity" defense to a finding that a plant
removal or relocation violates section 8(a)(3).94
At first glance it seems that those courts employing a "critical"
standard most closely follow the language and holding of Southport.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated the question as "[w]hether there
was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership which would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the
Board's order - or merely a disguised continuance of the old employer ...." 95 The courts following the "critical" standard have extended this language in stating that the purpose of the test is to prevent
a "sham transfer of assets. " 96
Although the language of Southport might seem to support this
extension, the Court's holding was limited to much narrower grounds
in which the intent to evade was clear. 97 In addition, the array of
court and Board opinions examined in this Part demonstrates that
there is no clear agreement as to what the language of Southport requires. Finally, the Supreme Court itself has cast doubt on the limiting language of Southport in the successorship case of Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board Hotel & Restaurant Employees.98 Justice Marshall's description of alter ego cases as involving
"mere technical change[s] .. . frequently to avoid the effect of the labor
24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983)). Iowa Express also cites Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 638-39; Penntech Papers, 706 F.2d at 24 (citing NLRB v. Tricor Prods.,
636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980), and quoting Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at
638); NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 790 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Slicker, supra
note 64, at 1064 and T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW§ 17.02[3] (1972)).
92. E.g., Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 639 (stating that an "employer must
act from anti-union animus"). The Note does not give a reason for the requirement, and simply
cites a Sixth Circuit case from 1963, NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.
1963), which is no longer valid law in that jurisdiction. See NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780
F.2d 576, 582 (6th Cir. 1986) (intent is "relevant").
93. 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
95. Southport, 315 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added).
96. Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 238 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1088 (1984), which in turn quotes Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983)).
97. See Part I.B.l supra.
98. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
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laws," 99 and his statement that the purpose of the alter ego inquiry is
to determine whether the successor employer "is in reality the same
employer," 100 suggest intent is not required. At most, intent should be
a "relevant" consideration in those "frequent" cases described by the
Court. This Note maintains, however, that it is better to concentrate
on the "same employer" language - inquiring as to whether an entity
is objectively unchanged - rather than asking the reason for a technical change in corporate form.101
Proponents of the "critical" standard may attempt to justify it as
simply a stronger form of the "relevant" standard. In Crest Tankers,
Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 102 the Eighth Circuit stated:
The Sixth Circuit has recently accepted an argument that a finding of
anti-union animus or "employer intent [to evade obligations under the
NLRA] is not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status."
NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) ....
A requirement that employer intent be demonstrated could hinder the
goals of the doctrine, the Al/coast Court said: "[A]n employer who desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the doctrine by altering the corporations's structure based on some legitimate
business reason, retaining essentially the same business and utilizing the
change to escape the unwanted obligations." 780 F.2d at 582. We consider the difference between this statement and our position . . . to be
largely one of degree, and note that the mere existence of "some legitimate business reason" for a change in corporate organization should not
alone prevent a finding of alter ego status. 103

This argument is deficient in two respects. First, it has little force
unless one accepts the proposition that intent has some role i.n an alter
ego analysis. 104 Second, the "difference ... of degree" is vast - the
Eighth Circuit reads Al/coast too narrowly. Although the Al/coast
court is concerned with the danger of pretext in that case, it states the
alter ego test in broader terms: "[A] finding of employer intent ... is
merely one of the relevant factors the Board can consider . . . . [T]he
alter ego analysis should be .flexible." 105 The test does not rule out
finding alter ego status without considering intent - the Board could
even find alter ego status if an employer's sole justification for its corporate transformation was a legitimate business reason. 106 In contrast,
99. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5 (emphasis added). See Part l.C supra.
100. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5 (emphasis added).
101. See Parts 11.C and III infra.
102. 796 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1986).
103. 796 F.2d at 238 n.2 (bracketed material in original, selected citations omitted, emphasis
added).
104. This Note rejects all of the motive-based standards in favor of an objective test. See
Parts 11.B, 11.C & III infra.
105. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
106. However, this interpretation of A/lcoast may itself be too broad. The court states that
"[a]n inquiry into employer intent may be appropriate in other situations involving application of
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the Board has no such flexibility under the Eighth Circuit's test - it
can consider the Crawford Door factors "'til the cows come home,"
but ultimately it cannot find alter ego status without first finding an
intent to evade.
A third potential justification for the "critical" standard turns on
an analogy to the "runaway shop" cases, in which the employer relocates, or shifts work from a union to a nonunion plant. While "[t]here
is general agreement that if the employer's move is motivated by hostility toward and a desire to escape the union, the action violates Section 8(a)(3)," 107 the Supreme Court has not spoken ,on whether
animus is required, 108 and some courts of appeals have allowed a
"business necessity" defense. 109 Considering intent to be a "critical"
requirement in alter ego cases likewise implies that a "business necessity" defense 110 would negate an alter ego finding.
The analogy between the use of intent in "runaway shop" cases
and its use in alter ego situations does not survive close examination.
First, the factual context and legal consequences in which "runaway
shop" and alter ego cases arise implicate different policies. In an alter
ego case, the employer's argument is that the reason it is neither oblithe alter ego doctrine but here it simply is not necessary." 780 F.2d at 583. It notes that "the
record shows some evidence of anti-union animus." 780 F.2d at 583 n.9.
107. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 246. See Local 57, Intl. Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citation
omitted) ("While an employer may terminate his business for any reason, it is equally well-settled
that he may not transfer its situs to deprive his employees of rights protected by Section 7."),
cert denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
108. Although the Court has ruled that "an employer has the absolute right to terminate his
entire business for any reason," Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263,
268 (1965), it specifically stated in that case that it was "not presented .•• with a case of a
'runaway shop,' whereby Darlington would transfer its work to another plant or open a new
plant in another locality to replace its closed plant." 380 U.S. at 272.
109. See, e.g.. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Though
there may have been animosity between the Union and Rapid, animosity furnishes no basis for
the inference that this was the preponderant motive for the move when convincing evidence was
received demonstrating business necessity."); NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir.
1960) ("[T]he change was made because of reasonably anticipated increased costs, regardless of
whether this increased costs [sic] was caused by the advent of the Union or by some other factor
... ."),cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961). It could be argued, however, that the alter ego cases
themselves militate against considering intent as "critical," because the courts involved - the
Second and Sixth Circuits - have both rejected intent as "critical" in an alter ego context.
The economic motive/animus distinction is itself open to criticism. Some questions raised in
the "runaway shop" context are:
Is it practical, or even possible, to authorize relocations or plant removals motivated by the
anticipation of increased costs which a union will bring, but to hold illegal such action when
motivated by "anti-union animus"? What is anti-union animus, if not a resistance to the
union because of the economic burdens it will impose ... 7 Are not these added laborrelated costs exactly what engenders employer antipathy toward the union? How often is it
that the employer nurtures "anti-union animus" which is not economically based? If such is
rare indeed, then what is left of Section 8(a)(3) in these kinds of cases?
A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 247.
110. A "business necessity" defense was in essence asserted by the employer in Al/coast. See
Part 11.B infra.
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gated to bargain nor bound to its predecessor's collective bargaining
contract is because it is an entirely "new" corporation. In contrast, a
"runaway shop" involves the same employer - there is no contention
that the employer is free of all obligations due to the relocation. Even
though an employer may not have the duty to bargain with the union
over its decision to shift work, it will still be bound to bargain over the
effects of its decision, and may also be required to continue recognizing the union.
Second, "runaway shops" generally involve some finding of discrimination under section 8(a)(3). 111 Alter ego cases, in contrast, almost always focus on refusal-to-bargain charges under section 8(a)(5),
and only sometimes involve discrimination charges under section
8(a)(3). 112 The Supreme Court set out the appropriate section 8(a)(5)
standard in NLRB v. Katz. 113 In that case, the employer unilaterally
changed several terms that were the subject of upcoming negotiations
with the union. 114 The Court rejected the employer's argument that it
had changed the terms in "good faith," stating:
A refusal to negotiate in/act as to any subject which is within§ 8(d), and
about which the union seeks to negotiate, violates § 8(a)(5) though the
employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon an
over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains
to that end. . . . [I]t is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which
frustrates the objectives of§ 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal. 115

Nothing circumvents an alter ego employer's duty to negotiate more
than a flat refusal to bargain with the union on any subject. Unlike the
"runaway shop" cases, in which the union continues to be recognized
and bargained with, the alter ego employer - claiming to be entirely
"new" - refuses to recognize the union, to bargain, and to honor its
collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, even conceding that section 8(a)(3) has general applicability to alter ego cases, this does not justify the "critical" standard. The
Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Co. 116 supports the
proposition that some employer actions do not require a specific find111. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note I, at 246.
112. See note 12 supra. See also Cox, A Reexamination of the Role ofEmployer Motive under
Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
161, 170 (1982) (footnotes omitted) ("The standard wisdom has been and continues to be that
motive ... is an element of Section 8(a)(3).").
113. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
114. 369 U.S. at 737.
115. 369 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added).
116. 373 U.S. 221 (1963). The Erie Resistor analysis is also applied in "lockout" cases. See
American Shipbldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388
U.S. 26 (1967). "Lockouts" are the counterpart to an employee strike - the employer "locks
out," i.e., withholds work from, the employees as an economic weapon/response to the employees' concerted activities. Although a discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this Note,
the literature concerning "lockout" cases is extensive. See Cox, supra note 112, at 163 n.4 (listing
14 sources).
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ing of intent because they are inherently destructive of employee
rights. In Erie Resistor, the employer decided to continue operations
after its union employees went on strike. 117 It hired replacement
workers, giving them "super-seniority" (by adding twenty years to the
length of service) for purposes of future layoffs and recalls. 118 Nine
months after the strike ended, Erie's work force was half its prestrike
size, and many of the union workers without "super-seniority" had
been laid off. 119 The union filed unfair-labor-practice charges under
sections 8(a)(l) and (3), challenging the super-seniority plan and the
resulting layoffs. 120 The NLRB's holding that specific evidence of discriminatory intent was not required was reversed by the Third Circuit.121 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Board, stating:
We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, in the absence
of a finding of specific illegal intent, a legitimate business purpose is always a defense to an unfair labor practice charge.... "Some conduct
may by its very nature contain the implications of the required intent;
the natural foreseeable consequences of certain action may warrant the
inference...."
The outcome may well be the same [as when specific evidence of subjective intent is shown] when intent is founded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. The employer in
such cases must be held to intend the very consequences which
foreseeably and inescapably flow from his actions .... 122

The destructive effect of a corporate transformation on employee
rights is equally evident in an examination of the policy considerations
attendant to alter ego cases. 123 Thus, whether the problem is approached from a section 8(a)(3) discrimination perspective, or from
that of a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain, 124 the "critical" standard
(as well as the standards below that consider intent in some lesser degree) cannot be justified.
117. 373 U.s, at 222-23.
118. 373 U.S. at 223.
119. 373 U.S. at 224.
120. 373 U.S. at 224.
121. 373 U.S. at 225-26.
122. 373 U.S. at 227-28 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Supreme Court reiterated
this position in the "lockout" cases. See American Shipbldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311
(1965) ("[S]ome practices ... are inherently so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of
significant economic justification that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership or other antiunion animus is required."); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,
34 (1967) ("[I]f it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was
'inherently destructive' of important employee rights, no proof of anti-union motivation is
needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence
that the conduct was motivated by business considerations.").
123. See Part III infra.
124. See text at notes 111-15 supra.
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The ''Relevant, but Not Prerequisite" Standard

In contrast to the "critical" standard, seven federal courts of appeals - the Second, 125 Fifth, 126 Sixth, 127 Seventh, 128 Ninth, 129
Tenth, 130 and District of Columbia131 Circuits - have in varying degrees adopted a standard in which "employer intent is not essential or
prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, it is merely one
of the relevant factors the Board can consider ...." 132 Most of the
NLRB's members have also apparently adopted this approach. 13 3
Although there are several discrete "variations on a theme" among the
courts in stating the "relevant" standard, 134 the differences are not significant to analyzing the merits of this approach. The focus in this
discussion will therefore center on the Sixth Circuit's thoughtful reflection on the "relevant" standard in NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer,
125. Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984).
126. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 508 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
127. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
128. NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1268 n.4 (7th Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit appeared to require intent in a more recent case by including "unlawful motivation" in its recitation
of the elements proven by the General Counsel. NLRB v. Dane County Dairy, 795 F.2d 1313,
1322 (7th Cir. 1986). However, the employer was "openly hostile," 795 F.2d at 1322, and the
court makes no mention of Bell. It is safe to assume that the Seventh Circuit still adheres to the
"relevant" standard.
129. Tanaka Constr. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 1982).
130. NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980).
131. Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
132. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
133. See, e.g., Apex Decorating Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1459, 1459 n.2 (1985); Advance Elec.,
Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1002 (1984); Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1301, 1302
(1982), enforced, 725 F.2d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Watt Elec. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 655, 658 (1984)
(statement of AU); Samuel Kosoff & Sons, 269 N.L.R.B. 424, 429 (1984) (statement of AU).
134. For example, both the Second and Sixth Circuits stress a "flexible approach ... allowing
the Board to weigh all the relevant factors instead of requiring it to always show the employer's
intent to evade." Al/coast, 780 F.2d at 582; Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11
(2d Cir. 1984). The D.C. Circuit has assigned a slightly greater role to motive, giving it "substantial weight." Fugazy, 725 F.2d at 1419.
Although there is some dispute about the Tenth Circuit's position, see note 86 supra, the
court's language positions it most comfortably with the "relevant" standard. In Tricor, the court
states:
There is no hard-and-fast rule. If an employer makes changes in its business operation to
deliberately get rid of the union, the employer is more likely to be an alter ego. If, however,
the employer has legitimate economic reasons for the changes, and is not motivated by antiunion sentiment, the second employer is more likely to be deemed a mere successor ....
[W]e think evidence of anti-union sentiment by an employer ... is germane.
636 F.2d at 270 (emphasis added).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's position on the role of motive is unclear. While it has stated that
"[n]o factor is controlling and all need not be present," Tanaka Constr. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029,
1033 (9th Cir. 1982), seemingly placing it in the "relevant" category, it cites the Radio Union
"single employer" factors as its alter ego test. See note 66 supra. The Fifth Circuit has pointed
out the Ninth Circuit's failure to see that "the doctrines are conceptually distinct." Carpenters
Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 508 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982). See also
Befort, supra note 66, at 100 & n.233 (same).
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Inc. 135 This subpart will show that although Allcoast overcomes many
of the shortcomings of the "critical" standard, the "relevant" standard
still retains the potential of failing at both extremes - erroneously
failing to find alter ego status by allowing a legitimate business justification defense, and.finding alter ego status by considering animus even
though the predecessor employer received no foreseeable benefit.
A brief recitation of Allcoast's facts will help in understanding the
court's analysis of the "relevant" standard. The employer originally
operated in the moving business under both its own Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) license and as an agent for Atlas Van Lines
under Atlas's ICC license. 136 Atlas subsequently adopted a new policy
prohibiting its agents from operating concurrently under their own
and Atlas's licenses; however, Atlas suggested that operating the
licenses under two separate corporations would be acceptable. 137 Mr.
Harris, the owner, took Atlas's advice and split the predecessor corporation into two successor companies. 138 While he conceded that one of
the new entities (Allcoast Transfer) was bound to the predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement, he claimed that the second entity
(Ward Moving) was a "new" corporation and was free from all collective bargaining obligations. 139
There was no dispute that the Crawford Door factors were met. 140
Harris's sole contention was that intent to evade "is a prerequisite for
imposition of alter ego status," 141 and that the "change in corporate
form was necessitated solely by Atlas' policy change." 142 After thoroughly examining the existing standards - "critical," "relevant, but
not prerequisite," and "foreseeable benefit" - Judge Contie, speaking
for a unanimous court, concluded that "a finding of employer intent is
not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead,
it is merely one of the relevant factors .... "143
Judge Contie's arguments against adopting a "critical" standard
were based on the danger of pretext and on the need for flexibility:
If we were to require a finding of employer intent, an employer who
135. 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986).
136. 780 F.2d at 577.
137. 780 F.2d at 577-78.
138. 780 F.2d at 578.
139. 780 F.2d at 578. As discussed earlier, Al/coast is a nontraditional "double·breasting"
case. See note 67 supra.
140. See Part l.B supra. For example, the Board found identical ownership of the corpora·
tions. 780 F.2d at 582. Mr. Harris admitted, "I own both companies .•••" Brief for NLRB at
14, Al/coast (No. 84-591). As was noted earlier, however, neither the Board nor the courts re·
quire absolute identity of ownership. See note 54 supra. Mr. Harris also managed both com pa·
nies and made all major policy decisions. 780 F.2d at 582. In addition, both companies used
their equipment interchangeably and operated out of the same facility. 780 F.2d at 578.
141. 780 F.2d at 579.
142. 780 F.2d at 579.
143. 780 F.2d at 581.
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desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the
doctrine by altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate
business reason, retaining essentially the same business, and utilizing the
change to escape unwanted obligations. Our flexible approach will discourage such attempts at circumvention by allowing the Board to weigh
all the relevant factors .... Accordingly, even when purportedly legitimate reasons support an alteration in structure, the Board can prevent an
employer from avoiding obligations under the Act. 144

The court's pretextual argument is a valid criticism of the "critical"
standard, given that employers with evasive intent have in fact made
this contention. 145 Unfortunately, the "flexibility" given to the Board
to prevent circumvention by ''purportedly legitimate reasons" leaves
open the possibility of a defense to alter ego status when there actually
is a legitimate business justification. 146 As Part III maintains, legitimate employee expectations will be defeated if an entity that is "in
reality the same employer," 147 determined on an objective basis, can
avoid its collective bargaining obligations for any reason - including
a nonlabor-related reason.14s
At the other extreme, the "flexibility" provided by the Al/coast decision could potentially result in the Board's overvaluing the presence
of animus - finding an alter ego relationship where there is no foreseeable benefit to the predecessor employer - contravening Textile
144. 780 F.2d at 582 (emphasis added).
145. Harris in Al/coast may have had such evasive intent. The court noted: "[E]ven though
the Board made no finding regarding Harris' intent, the record shows some evidence of antiunion animus. At the hearing before the AU, Harris testified "I don't want it [the union], I'll be
honest with you, who needs it, who wants it." 780 F.2d at 583 n.9 (brackets in original). See also
note 146 infra; notes 207-14 infra and accompanying text.
146. Judge Contie states, "An inquiry into employer intent may be appropriate in other situations involving application of the alter ego doctrine •... " 780 F.2d at 583. He continues,
"Harris viewed a change in corporate structure as the opportunity to evade unwanted obligations
under the Act.". 780 F.2d at 583 n.9. The general tenor of the court's discussion leaves open the
possibility that an alter ego relationship might not be found if there were a corporate transformation in response to a legitimate business reason, even if the "new" employer were "in reality the
same employer."
The Board's decision not to find alter ego status might go something like this: "Animus is
relevant; there is no animus present in this case, so the employer's good faith transformation
outweighs the other Crawford Door criteria which are admittedly present." But see Reply Brief
for Respondent at 5, Al/coast (No. 84-5961) ("It is undoubtedly true that intent alone cannot give
rise to a Section 8(a)(5) violation: an employer may unabashedly hope to 'evade his obligations
under the Act' but, in the absence of sufficient organizational similarity, the employer presumably could not be deemed to be an alter ego.") (emphasis in original).
147. See text at note 76 supra.
148. To argue that the successor employer who is "in reality the same employer" should be
allowed to avoid its union obligations because of a change for a nonlabor-related reason is a non
sequitur. As the ALJ pointed out in Al/coast:
While these circumstances may explain the decision to create Ward Moving as a separate
corporation, they do not explain a totally separate and subsequent decision on Harris' part
in refusing to apply ... the terms and conditions of employment which governed their
performance of Atlas work prior to the change in corporate structure.
Allcoast Transfer, 271 N.L.R.B. 1374, 1379 (1984) (statement of ALJ), enforced, NLRB v.
Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986).
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Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 149 The Eighth Circuit's explanation of the relevance of motive, although in the context
of the "critical" standard, provides a glimpse of this danger:
[A] number of factors, including anti-union motivation, are being treated
as relevant to the question whether one employer, formally separate,
should be viewed as legally the same as another. When the requisite
degree of anti-union motivation is present, this question is answered
"yes," even though the other factors considered might not suffice to produce this result. 1so

One example of animus overvaluation is the NLRB's decision in
Denzil S. Alkire. 1s1 In that case, the Board overruled the ALJ's finding that, despite animus evident by both the employer and union, 1s2
the Supreme Court's holding in Darlington allowed the employer to go
out of business. 1s3 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Board's finding of
alter ego status based on the lack of a foreseeable benefit to the predecessor employer. 1s4 The Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach ....:.... which prevents the overvaluation of animus
displayed by the Board in Alkire - was rejected out of hand by Judge
Contie as falling within the "critical" rubric. 1ss If the Fourth Circuit's
test unambiguously fell within this rubric, Judge Contie's rejection of
the test would be appropriate; however, the test can also be applied on
an objective basis, and thus deserves additional scrutiny.
C.

The ''Reasonably Foreseeable Benefit" Standard

The Fourth Circuit's approach to the alter ego test is based on the
concept of a "reasonably foreseeable benefit." In Alkire v. NLRB, 156
Judge Gordon, speaking for a divided court, stated the two-step
analysis:
When business operations are transferred, the initial question is whether
substantially the same entity controls both the old and new employer. If
this control exists, then the inquiry must turn to whether the transfer
resulted in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination of its labor obligations. 157
149. 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965) ("an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire
business for any reason he pleases").
150. Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 236 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986).
151. 259 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1982), enforcement denied, Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th
Cir. 1983). For a detailed discussion of the case, see notes 160-69 infra and accompanying text.
152. "When Alkire [the employer] told the assembled employees that he could not afford to
operate under union scale, they responded with applause." 259 N.L.R.B. at 1329.
153. See text at notes 164-67 infra.
154. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1021. The Fourth Circuit's "foreseeable benefit" approach is discussed at length in Part II.C infra.
155. See NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 579 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986) ("A similar,
but purportedly broader [than the 'critical' standard], approach was adopted by the Fourth Cir·
cuit .... ").
156. 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983).
157. 716 F.2d at 1020 (emphasis added).
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The "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test provides an excellent foundation for overcoming the problems of both the "critical" and "relevant"
standards. This section explores the court's rationale for the approach, its advantages relative to the previously discussed standards,
and two ways in which it can be strengthened - first, through the
explicit retention of the Crawford Door factors; 158 and second, by considering whether the change "resulted in" 159 a foreseeable benefit, regardless of the motive for that change.
In Alkire, the employer informed his employees that he was going
out of business, and subsequently entered a sale-lease agreement with a
successor corporation (Mountaineer) formed by a former employee for
the purpose of taking over the business. 160 The sales agreement provided that, until financing was attained to complete the sale, the former owner (Alkire) would receive the net profits from the business, as
well as a weekly consulting fee. 161 After a coal strike that had caused
the lay-off of most of Alkire's coal-hauling truckers ended, the "new"
employer, Mountaineer, refused to rehire many of the former Alkire
employees, 162 resulting in section 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) charges. 163
The Administrative Law Judge found that
Alkire terminated his employees for a nondiscriminatory and lawful reason; namely, because he was going out of business. An employer has an
absolute right, under the Act, to go out of business regardless of the
motivation. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,
380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965).164

The NLRB disagreed with the ALJ's characterization of the case
as "involving, simply, an employer's right to go out ofbusiness." 165 It
found "that the Administrative Law Judge failed to analyze properly
the complaint .... Central to [this action is] whether an alter ego
relationship existed ...." 166 The Board proceeded to focus on the
Crawford Door factors, rejecting the ALJ's finding that Alkire had
gone out of business, and finding the existence of an alter ego relation158. The discussion in Part I.B supra addresses the Crawford Door factors in detail; therefore, the factors will not be reviewed in this Part.
159. See text at note 157 supra.
160. 716 F.2d at 1016.
161. 716 F.2d at 1017.
162. 716 F.2d at 1017.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (1982). The § 8(a)(3) discrimination charge rested upon
Mountaineer's "requiring the employees to file new employment applications ... and by ...
[denying or delaying the recall of] economic strikers ... who had made unconditional offers to
return to work." Denzil S. Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1323 (1982), enforcement denied, Alkire
v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983). For the text of§ 8(a)(3), see note 12 supra. For a
discussion of the derivative nature of§ 8(a)(l), see note 11 supra.
164. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1331 (statement of AU).
165. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1325.
166. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1324.
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ship. 167 The Fourth Circuit, however, denied enforcement of the
Board's decision, agreeing with the ALJ's Darlington analogy. Judge
Gordon compared the competing policies of an employer's right to go
out of business with the successor doctrine's pronouncement that
[s]urrounding circumstances ... viewed in light of national labor policy,
may "require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to
rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be
balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in
the employment relationship." John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 549 (1964). 168

The court concluded that the addition of a "reasonably foreseeable
benefit" requirement set the proper bounds of these competing
policies. 169
Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit's test is viewed as objective or motive-based, the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach
has certain advantages over the other standards. For example, unlike
the "critical" standard, the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach
comports more closely with the Supreme Court's description of the
alter ego doctrine in Howard Johnson. Justice Marshall there described the doctrine as applicable to transformations designed ''frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws." 170 The "critical"
standard will allow an employer to escape alter ego status unless intent
to evade is shown; yet, Justice Marshall did not describe such transformations as being designed "always" to avoid the effect of the labor
laws. Likewise, a "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach is superior to the "relevant" standard because it provides a safeguard against
Board overvaluation of animus in contravention of the Supreme
Court's holding in Darlington. m
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would allow an employer to escape alter ego status if the employer had a legitimate business reason for making a change in corporate form that also
resulted in a benefit related to eliminating labor obligations. Although
the Alkire test's objective language appears to prevent exactly this situ167. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1324-26.
168. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted).
169. 716 F.2d at 1020. The court's stated rationale was this:
Without some future benefit reasonably accruing from the employer's action, ..• the trans·
fer of ownership is bona fide. If, however, the transfer, by eliminating an NLRA-imposed
duty, provides a continuing benefit to the old employer, then the force of the closing survives
the transfer. To the extent that obtaining the benefit was a motive for the transfer, or was a
reasonably foreseeable effect, the result represents a disguised continuance of the old
employer.
716 F.2d at 1020 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the competing policy considerations, see
Part III infra.
170. See text at note 76 supra.
171. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees,
417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974) (emphasis added); see also text at notes 149-55 supra.
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ation, 172 Judge Gordon appears to let motive in through the back
door, stating, "Linking employer motivation for the transfer of its
business to obtaining a future benefit represents a broader standard
than does requiring '[a]nti-union animus or intent to evade labor obligations' .... " 173 The Sixth Circuit, 174 scholarly commentary, 175 and
the Alkire dissent itself, 176 view this language as supporting the proposition that motive is a relevant or even a critical consideration in the
Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test. The Fourth
Circuit recently reiterated this motive-based language in NLRB v.
McAllister Bros. 177
There are two possible approaches to reconciling the Fourth Circuit's apparently motive-based "foreseeable benefit" test with this
Note's position that motive is not relevant. One approach is to analyze the circumstances in Alkire and McAllister, as well as the Darlington analogy on which the court's test is based. Neither Alkire nor
McAllister involved an employer that changed its corporate form for a
legitimate business reason while casting off its labor obligations as a
secondary consideration. 178 No legitimate business reason validated
Alkire's transformation; rather, the predecessor employer was found
to have gone out of business while receiving no foreseeable benefit
from the successor employer179 - a situation in which the Darlington
analogy holds motive to be irrelevant.
Likewise, McAllister did not involve an employer changing its corporate form for a legitimate business reason. Judge Sprouse, speaking
172. See text at note 157 supra.
173. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983).
174. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
175. See Befort, supra note 66, at 97 (The Fourth Circuit "recast[s] the alter ego test by
requiring a finding of intent but in a purportedly more lenient form.").
176. Judge Sprouse's dissenting opinion in Alkire focused on his disagreement with the majority over the role of motive:
My principal disagreement ... is with the majority's conclusion that "employer motivation"
is central to determining alter ego status. As the majority concedes, [Southport) does not
require the NLRB to show that the employer intended to evade the purposes of the NLRA,
in order to find alter ego status. Nor has such a requirement been imposed by the many
courts which have discussed Board findings of alter ego status....
Employer motivation may be relevant to this inquiry, but it is certainly not, as the majority apparently believes, determinative.
716 F.2d at 1022 (Sprouse, J., dissenting) (citations omitted; emphasis added). He thus viewed
the Fourth Circuit as adopting the "critical" standard. But see NLRB v. McAllister Bros., 819
F.2d 439, 445 n.14 (4th Cir. 1987) (Judge Sprouse's majority opinion, although supposedly following the Alkire precedent, states: "imposition of alter-ego status under Alkire does not hinge
on proof that the employer intended to evade the labor laws.").
177. 819 F.2d 439, 445 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[T)he elimination of ... [the predecessor employer's) bargained-for employee commitments was the instrumental purpose motivating the
transfer to ... [the successor employer]."). The court's language is softened by its footnote
stating that intent is not always required, and also by the fact that the McAllister court found
clear evidence of animus. 819 F.2d at 445 n.14.
178. See notes 160-69 & 177 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
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for a unanimous court, found that the predecessor employer's "elimination of . . . bargained-for employee commitments was the instrumental purpose motivating the transfer to [the successor
employer]." 180 Judge Sprouse's statemen!J}:iM "imposition of alterego status under Alkire does not hinge on proof that the employer
intended to evade the labor laws," 181 while dicta, demonstrates that
the court might be willing to find alter ego status in spite of a transformation motivated by a nonlabor-related reason. The language of the
test itself - which uses the term "resulted in," 182 rather than "motivated by," a reasonably foreseeable benefit - supports this
interpretation.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's Darlington analogy must be viewed in
light of the Darlington case itself. Darlington Manufacturing Company owned and operated one textile mill. 183 A majority of its stock,
however, was held by the Milliken family (headed by Roger Milliken),
which controlled seventeen textile manufacturers and twenty-seven
mills. 184 After the union won representation at Darlington in a bitterly contested election, Milliken decided to liquidate the company.18s
The NLRB found that the closing was motivated by anti-union
animus in violation of section 8(a)(3). 186 The Fourth Circuit, however, denied enforcement of the Board's order, finding an absolute
right to close all or part of a business for any reason, including animus.187 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, agreed that an employer has the right to close all of its business for any reason; however,
he did not agree with the Fourth Circuit's assertion that such a right
exists for a partial closure, stating, "[A]n employer has the absolute
right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases, but ...
such right [does not] include[] the ability to close part of a business no
matter what the reason."188
Darlington should be viewed as a section 8(a)(3) discrimination
case, in which motive is an important inquiry unless an employer
closes the entire business. This principle is equally important in setting the outer bounds of finding an alter ego relationship; however the
180. McAllister, 819 F.2d at 445.
181. 819 F.2d 445 n.14; see also note 176 supra.
182. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1020; see also, text at note 157 supra.
183. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 265 (1965).
184. 380 U.S. at 265.
185. 380 U.S. at 265·66.
186. 380 U.S. at 267.
187. 380 U.S. at 268.
188. 380 U.S. at 268. The Court remanded Darlington to the Board to consider whether
§ 8(a)(3) was violated:
[A] partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) if motivated by a purpose to
chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may
reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect.
380 U.S. at 275 (emphasis added).
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"discrimination" focus of section 8(a)(3), appropriate in Darlington, is
not necessary in the typical alter ego case, which involves an objective
section 8(a)(5) inquiry.189
A second possible approach to reconciling the Fourth Circuit's apparently motive-based stanaard and an objective standard is simply to
accept that the court will consider motive in some degree. 190 However, the analysis up to this point has shown the need for an objective
inquiry, and the language of the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test
supports such an inquiry. 191 This Note suggests rewording the Fourth
Circuit's "foreseeable benefit" test as follows, in order to include the
Crawford Door factors explicitly and to state the objective nature of
the test:
When business operations are transferred, the initial question is whether
the old and new employer are the same employer in fact, given the
Board's consideration of the following factors: substantially identical
management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership. If the employers are determined by the Board to
be in reality the same employer, then the inquiry must turn to whether
the transfer resulted in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to
the old employer related to the elimination of its labor obligations, regardless of the motivation for the change in corporate form.192

Policy considerations lend further support to this modified approach.

Ill.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYEE
EXPECTATIONS AND EMPLOYER FREEDOM

Beyond Congress's broad mandate to "promote industrial peace
and equality of bargaining power" 193 by "removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife," 194 the NLRB" and the courts are given
little legislative guidance. The task of reconciling "[t]he inherent tension between entrepreneurial prerogative and employee security" 195 is
thus left to the Board, 196 withjudicial oversight. 197 The policy considerations discussed in this Part - protecting legitimate employee ex189. See notes 12 & 113-15 supra and accompanying text.
190. The court clearly considers motive to be, at a minimum, "relevant." See text at notes
173 & 176 supra. It is possible, however, to consider intent as relevant to proving whether the
employer gained a foreseeable benefit, rather than viewing intent as an end in itself. The advantage of the former approach over the latter is the guidance given to the NLRB on the purpose for
which it is considering intent, rather than some vague notion about "relevance," and the various
possible degrees that it can, or must, be considered.
191. See text at note 157 supra.
192. Cf. text at notes 53, 76 & 157 supra.
193. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
194. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
195. Slicker, supra note 64, at 1051.
196. See NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982), supra note 30.
197. See NLRA § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982), supra note 32.
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pectations and delimiting employer freedom
strengthen the
argument for an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard.
A. Protecting Legitimate Employee Expectations (Pigs Is Pigs 19B)
The fundamental proposition on which this Note is based ·is this:
determining whether an old and a new employer are "in reality the
same employer" should depend on the identity of the entity, not on its
reason for becoming that entity. 199 As Professor Roger Abrams has
noted,
[M]anagement can try to justify anything by citing economic necessity.
[But] they can't get away from their legal responsibilities by changing
the name over the door to something that looks like, sounds like, and
smells like the old firm. Companies can't get rid of unions if employees
want them, just as a union can't force itself on workers. 200

Preventing "industrial strife" through the protection of legitimate employee expectations can be achieved in two ways - ensuring fairness
and avoiding the danger of pretext - both of which are advanced by
an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test.
It is fundamentally unfair if an employer can use a change in its
corporate form - for any reason - to gain an unfair advantage over
its employees. 201 There is no difference, from an employee's point of
view, whether the employer changed its form for labor or nonlaborrelated reasons. Thus, the equitable principle that substance should
prevail over form, 202 should be invoked in spite of the normal assumptions about limited corporate liability. 203 The "critical," "relevant,"
198. This phrase is borrowed from E.P. BUTLER, PIGS Is PIGS (1906). The book has nothing
to do with law, and little to do with anything else; however, the title cogently states this subpart's
thesis.
199. The definition of "alter ego" itself is objective in nature, focusing on a state of being
rather than the reason for becoming that being: "[L, lit., second I]: a second self •... " WEB·
SfER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 63 (1981) (brackets in original).
200. Engel, supra note 7, at 20 (quoting Professor Abrams based on an interview for the
article) (brackets in original; emphasis added).
201. See Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983).
202. See, e.g., Dee Cee Floor Covering, 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 426 (1977) (statement of ALI)
("The labor law is concerned with substance, not with form. Constantly changing corporate
titles, or any other names, may serve a purpose under other laws, but they are meaningless
insofar as the employees are concerned .... ") See also P. MISCIMARRA, supra note 70, at 18182; Slicker, supra note 64, at 1063-64. Cf. Denzil S. Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1325 (1982),
enforcement denied, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983). In Alkire, the NLRB claimed to review the
"economic realities of the relationship." However, the Fourth Circuit declined to enforce the
Board's order because "it made no findings concerning an economic benefit obtained or reasonably expected." 716 F.2d at 1021.
203. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Alkire:
This analysis for imposition of alter ego status is similar to the standard employed to pierce
the corporate veil of a subsidiary corporation and hold its owner(s) liable for the debts of
that subsidiary. In corporate law, as in the labor field, the alter ego doctrine is an equitable
principle designed to prevent an entity from doing injury and then escaping responsibility by
hiding behind a corporate shield.
716 F.2d at 1021 n.5.
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and motive-based "foreseeable benefit" tests all fail, from a fairness-tothe-employee viewpoint, in cases where the employer's change is motivated by nonlabor-related reasons, but the employer nonetheless
changes the employee-employer relationship by rejecting its NLRA
duties.
The basic issue of fairness was used by Professor Befort as an argument for rejecting the "critical" standard in his discussion of Allcoast
as a "double-breasting"204 case:
The Allcoast case illustrates the basic unfairness of predicating alter
ego status upon proof of an employer's evasive intent. . . . [T]he employer ... established a new firm performing the same work in the same
market but without adherence to the labor agreement. Many, if not
most, of the circuit courts nonetheless would not apply the labor agreement to the new firm because of the alleged business justification for the
firm's creation. Such a result ignores the legitimate contract expectations
of the employees and the Board's traditional preference for contract enforcement. ... The employer's contractual responsibilities should accompany this benefit regardless of whether the new firm was created to
avoid the union or merely to comply with Atlas' change in policy. 205

Allowing an employer to escape its obligations merely because its
transformation was motivated by a legitimate reason not only defeats
its employees' legitimate expectations, it also allows the employer to
exceed its own expectations. As a signatory to the collective bargaining
contract,206 the employer could not have expected to escape the terms
of its contract.
A second way of protecting legitimate employee ·expectations is by
avoiding the danger of pretext. ·Except for the "critical" standard, all
of the approaches discussed in Part II achieve this goal. 207 The danger
of adopting intent as a prerequisite to alter ego status is the possible
evasion by some employers of their collective bargaining obligations
through a nonlabor-related pretext. As Judge Contie stated in
Allcoast:
If we were to require a finding of employer intent, an employer who

desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the
doctrine by altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate
business reason, retaining essentially the same business, and utilizing the
change to escape unwanted obligations. 208
204. See note 67 supra.
205. Befort, supra note 66, at 99 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
206. The essence of alter ego status is a finding that the old and new employers are one and
the same. See notes 70 & 76 supra and accompanying text.
207. Unfortunately, all of the motive-based standards fail to achieve the other policy considerations discussed in Part III.
208. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 582 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit
was not discussing a hypothetical problem in Al/coast; as the owner of Allcoast admitted to the
AU, "I don't want it [the union], I'll be honest with you, who needs it, who wants it." 780 F.2d
at 583 n.9 (brackets in original). See also 780 F.2d at 578 n.2 (owner originally changed location
of "new" employer "to look good and play the game").
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Nor is Al/coast an isolated instance of an employer seizing upon a nonlabor-related motive to rid itself of unwanted labor obligations. For
example, in NLRB v. Tricor Products, 209 the change in corporate form
was "motivated by economics." 210 However.,..the owner "candidly admitted his anti-union sentiment" and "seized on the opportunity to rid
himself of the Union." 211 Likewise, in The Bell Co., 212 the employer
attempted to justify its corporate transformation on its "economic
plight." 213 The ALJ rejected the employer's argument, stating, "The
assertion that [the employer] was suffering economic reversals and
that its inability to make a profit was what prompted the discharge
was mere pretext."214
Even though the noncritical, motive-based standards are flexible
enough to prevent an employer from escaping its labor obligations
through a pretext, they are nonetheless transcended by an objective
"reasonably foreseeable benefit" test. Under an objective standard, an
employer cannot escape its labor obligations regardless of the motivation; thus, the Board is not left the difficult task of differentiating legitimate and pretextual reasons. This better preserves the legitimate
expectations of employees. While this subpart has focused on employee expectations, a discussion of policy arguments would not be
complete without considering the proper boundaries of employer freedom, the next subject of this Note.
B. Delimiting Employer Freedom: The Supreme Court
Cases Revisited

One labor-relations attorney has asserted, " 'Shifting assets and re•
sponding to competitive pressures should remain a management prerogative.' He argues that 'labor may be creating a problem where
none exists.' " 215 However, in NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 216 Judge
Sloviter stated that the alter ego doctrine
represents a departure from the generally accepted principle that an employer's freedom to contract includes the right to transfer assets, reorganize its business or close a portion thereof without imposing on its
vendee the obligation to adopt its labor contract. NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282-84 (1972); Textile
209. 636 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1980).
210. 636 F.2d at 271.
211. 636 F.2d at 271.
212. 225 N.L.R.B. 474 (1976) (statement of AU), enforcement denied on other grounds,
NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1977).
213. 225 N.L.R.B. at 478 (statement of AU).
214. 225 N.L.R.B. at 482 (statement of AU). See also NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886, 888
(9th Cir. 1957), ajfd., 357 U.S. 10 (1958) (employer used what had initially been a legitimate
change in its business arrangement to "shake the union").
215. Engel, supra note 7, at 19 (quoting Arthur Rosenfeld, labor-relations attorney with the
United States Chamber of Commerce, based on an interview for the article).
216. 612 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1979).

April 1988)

Note -

Alter Ego Doctrine

1057

Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69

(1965). 217

Although Judge Sloviter's position on the role of motive is diametrically opposed to the thesi$iOf this Note, 218 her citation of Darlington
and the successorship cases provides the appropriate framework in
which to analyze the proper bounds of employer freedom vis-a-vis employee expectations. A review of these cases demonstrates that an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test properly delimits
employer freedom.
The Supreme Court has decided three successorship cases in which
the NLRB was faced with "reconcil[ing] the tension between the collective bargaining rights of the employees and the employer's right to
make use of his property as he sees fit. " 219 One of the Court's observations in the first of those cases, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 220 is
equally applicable to alter ego policy considerations. Justice Harlan,
speaking for the Court, stated:
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles
of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden
change in the employment relationship.221
The Court provided employees with a fair amount of protection in
Wiley. The case involved a bona fide merger between two publishing
companies (Interscience was merged into Wiley). 222 Interscience's
union sued under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act223 to compel arbitration of disputes arising under Interscience's
collective bargaining contract. The Court agreed with the union,
based on the "impressive policy considerations favoring arbitra217. 612 F.2d at 783 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). In Allcoast Transfer, 271 N.L.R.B. 1374
(statement of AU), enforced, NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986), the
predecessor and successor employers went so far as to assert that the alter ego doctrine represented "a deprivation of their Federal constitutional right to do business as they please." 271
N.L.R.B. at 1375. The ALJ rejected this constitutional argument, stating:
Since [the alter ego and single employer] doctrines are an integral part of the enforcement of
the Act, the Respondents are necessarily arguing that the Act is unconstitutional .... The
essence of Harris' argument is that the Act is invalid because it unconstitutionally prevents
him from doing what he want [sic] to do. I know of no such constitutional right.
The constitutional attack leveled herein on the National Labor Relations Act ... comes
late in the day.
271 N.L.R.B. at 1379 (citations & footnotes omitted). The ALJ's ruling on the constitutional
issue was not appealed. Al/coast is apparently the only attempt to make such a constitutional
argument.
218. See 612 F.2d at 789 ("[N]o policy reason has been advanced by the majority in support
of the extension of [the alter ego] doctrine to a situation where no evidence of any antiunion
animus appears on the record.").
219. Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 625.
220. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
221. 376 U.S. at 549.
222. 376 U.S. at 544-45.
223. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982); see note 74 supra.

1058

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:1024

tion," 224 and the "substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise. " 225
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 226 however, the
Court declined to extend the broad protection of its arbitration principle to the unfair-labor-practice context. In Burns, the successor employer hired a majority of the predecessor's work force in an armslength transaction. 227 After ruling that in such a case the successor
may be bound to recognize and bargain with the union, Justice White,
speaking for the Court, stated, "It does not follow, however, from
Burns' duty to bargain that it was bound to observe the substantive
terms of the collective-bargaining contract .... "22s
Justice White's refusal to bind an arms-length successor was based
on policy considerations wholly inapposite to the alter ego context.
He noted, "A potential employer niay be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes in corporate structure
[and] composition of the labor force .... " 229 In an alter ego case, the
successor employer is the predecessor employer, regardless of the reason for the change in corporate form. This is not a case of "having
contract provisions imposed upon them against their wi11"; 230 rather,
the alter ego employer is a signatory to the collective bargaining contract, achieving the Burns Court's desire that "the balance of bargaining advantage ... be set by economic power realities."23 1
•
Naturally, there must be some way of distinguishing an alter ego
case, involving "in reality the same employer," and an arms-length
successorship case. The line between the two doctrines is drawn by
the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Manufacturing Co., 232 which held that "an employer has the absolute
right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases." 233 If
224. 376 U.S. at 550. '
225. 376 U.S. at 551.
226. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
227. 406 U.S. at 275.
228. 406 U.S. at 281-82.
229. 406 U.S. at 287-88.
230. 406 U.S. at 287.
231. 406 U.S. at 288. Ultimately, the issue returns to that of legitimate employee expectations. This is apparent in Justice Marshall's opinion in the most recent successorship case Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974). He refers to an
alter ego transaction as "a paper transaction without meaningful impact on the ownership or
operation of the enterprise," specifically noting "that Howard Johnson [did not have] any previous dealings with the Union, [nor had it] participated in any way in negotiating or approving the
collective-bargaining agreements." 417 U.S. at 259 n.5. In stark contrast, an alter ego employer
has both negotiated and approved the contract. To borrow from the Supreme Court's language in
the super-seniority and "lockout" cases, allowing the employer to escape its contractual obligations ignores "the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself." 373
U.S. at 228. For the complete quote, see note 122 supra.
232. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
233. 380 U.S. at 268. See text at note 188 supra.
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business operations have actually ceased, there will be no foreseeable
benefit to the predecessor employer. 234 It is at this point that the
Burns Court's concerns about inhibiting a bona fide new employer
from taking over a "motj.9und business" and bargaining according to
"economic power realities" are appropriate. Darlington thus describes
an employer's right to go out of business for any reason, and the foreseeable benefit test indicates at what point the employer in fact has
gone out of business. In the final analysis, the Board's inquiry into
whether there was an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" to the
old employer constitutes a safeguard - verifying that the Crawford
Door factors were properly applied in determining alter ego status.
CONCLUSION

One of the most serious criticisms of the alter ego doctrine has
been that "[t]he many cases in this area demonstrate that alter ego
determinations - critical in many management rights contexts - are
apt to differ unpredictably frOJil case to case, depending not only upon
controlling facts but also on the predication of the adjudicating
body."235 Thus, the very flexibility that the Sixth Circuit views as a
strength in arguing for the "relevant" standard236 can also be viewed
as a weakness. 237
An objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test provides the
NLRB with flexibility by retaining discretion to weigh the seven Crawford Door factors. This captures the benefits of the flexible approach
espoused by those supporting the "relevant standard." It also avoids
the pitfalls of the "critical" standard, which cannot be supported on
the language of Southport, on an interpretation of the standard as a
234. This statement should be interpreted as meaning "business operations have ceased in a
particular line of business." For example, an employer in the textile business may decide to cease
textile operations and to redeploy its capital in, e.g., computer technology or agriculture. In such
a case, the Board should not find any foreseeable benefit related to the elimination of the employer's labor obligations - the employee bargaining unit no longer reflects the same "community of interests." See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), quoted at note 4 supra. See
generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 282-83 (discussing criteria for determining an appropriate bargaining unit). If the NLRB has properly applied the Crawford Door
and foreseeable-benefit criteria, the characteristics of the appropriate bargaining unit should be
unchanged, since the same employer in fact will be in the same line of business. See Part I.B
supra. (It should be noted that the NLRA does not apply at all in the field of agriculture. See
note 2 supra.).
235. P. MISCIMARRA, supra note 70, at 183 (footnotes omitted). See also Comment, DoubleBreasted Operations, supra note 67, at 48 ("[I]n an area where concrete standards, applied with
uniformity, are crucial to unions and employers alike, the law remains largely unascertainable.").
236. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
237. As one commentator has noted in the successorship context:
[T]he Court reaffirmed the existing policy of ad hoc evolution of general criteria . . . .
Therein lies Burns' greatest wisdom and, perhaps, its most telling weakness, for it permits
the widest possible flexibility in the face of constantly changing factual patterns, but at the
same time it diminishes predictability in an area of the law where predictable consequences
are exceedingly desirable.
Slicker, supra note 64, at 1104.
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variation on the "relevant" theme, by analogy to the "runaway shop''
cases, or on policy grounds.
Yet, at the same time, the objective "reasonably foreseeable benefir standard maintains predictability and uniformity by articulating
an approach that safeguards an employer's absolute right to go out of
business for any reason, including animus. This conforms with the
Supreme Court's holding in Darlington. Employer motive is thus
viewed as a means to an end in determining whether the old employer
anticipated a foreseeable benefit, rather than as an end in itself. Finally, the language 'of the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable
benefit" test, which in its own right is capable of supporting an objective interpretation, is strengthened by the explicit rejection of "legitimate business reasons" as a ground for avoiding alter ego status providing an additional safeguard for the protection of legitimate employee expectations. The National Labor Relations Act's goal of promoting industrial peace - not to mention a basic sense of fairness demands no less.
-

Gary Alan MacDonald

